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ABSTRACT. Perhaps the greatest impediment to a viable libertarianism is the
provision of a satisfactory explanation of how actions that are undetermined by an
agent’s character can still be under the control of, or ‘up to’, the agent. The ‘luck
problem’ has been most assiduously examined by Robert Kane who supplies a
detailed account of how this problem can be resolved. Although Kane’s theory
is innovative, insightful, and more resourceful than most of his critics believe,
it ultimately cannot account for the type of control that moral responsibility and
(ultimate) agency legitimately require.
Libertarians believe that free will and determinism are incompat-
ible and that we have free will. As a result they believe that some
indetermination infiltrates the world. In fact, most libertarians would
prefer not being committed to the idea that at least some of our
actions or choices are not determined, for indeterminism tends to
be a pesky bugaboo for their theory. It seems difficult to explain
how those behaviors and decisions that are the products of indeter-
ministic processes can be subject to our control or ‘up to us’. The
difficulty of such an explanation resides in the commonsense idea
that if an action or choice results from an indeterministic process,
and thus is undetermined, our control over this action is substan-
tially undermined if not completely eradicated. Regardless of what
transpires in our minds and bodies prior to our act or decision, the
fact that our mental and physical behavior is undetermined makes
it impossible for our antecedent lives to guarantee that a partic-
ular act or decision results. The resulting act is typically charac-
terized as ‘random’, ‘arbitrary’, ‘capricious’, ‘lucky’, ‘fluky’, or
‘chancy’.
The significance of a diminution, if not annihilation, of control,
comes into relief in two areas. Traditionally, philosophers have
believed that the legitimate ascription of moral responsibility
requires a very high, if not absolute, degree of control over the
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actions for which one is held responsible. Therefore, a lessening
of control presents worries about whether the threshold required
for moral responsibility is met. Worry is replaced by panic if our
control is simply absent. The second area where the extent of our
control over our mental and physical acts comes to the fore is in our
self-concept. We (normal, adult human beings) think of ourselves
as being in control of most of our daily acts and thoughts. Our
relationships to our activities are, by and large, agential. If indeter-
minism really does rob us of control over many, if not all, of our
mundane physical or mental activities, then we are not the prime
movers that we believe we are. Without control, we are more like
inert vessels for the events of the world than their active origins.
Such an epiphany would reveal how stubbornly we have misunder-
stood our relationship toward our actions. But the embarrassment is
much deeper. Recognizing that we have made an error is one thing;
discovering that we have lost, or rather never had, perhaps the prime
source of our dignity, is quite another.
All (suitably restricted) would be well if indeterminism did not
have the dire effect of eroding our control. We would have control of
our behavior, be legitimate subjects of moral responsibility, and have
the agential relationship with our acts and decisions that we have
always prized. Moreover, we would garner a bonus. If, as contem-
porary science tells us, we live in an irreducibly indeterministic
world, we would have a theory of free will that is scientifically
respectable. Let us investigate how well we fare.
1.
No libertarian has been as sensitive to the challenge that indeter-
minism brings to a viable libertarianism as Robert Kane. Through
a series of articles and books, Kane has offered a detailed account
of libertarianism that not only does not shy away from its commit-
ment to indeterminism but embraces it. Kane first formulates the
challenge of indeterminism in the ‘luck principle’.
(LP) If an action is undetermined at a time t, then its happening
rather than not happening at t would be a matter of chance
or luck, and so it could not be a free and responsible
action.1
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For Kane, free will applies primarily to the will itself, that is,
to mental actions like choices and decisions, and only secondarily
to overt, physical behavior. Kane situates the indeterminism in the
process that culminates in either a choice or decision, and not,
as do some libertarians, subsequent to the choice but prior to the
(overt) act. Although we agree with Kane regarding the locus of
the indeterminacy, the point is not central to our discussion, for
Kane’s proposed refutation of LP does not essentially rely upon the
location of the indeterminancy. If Kane’s argument against LP, and
more importantly, his argument for the viability of libertarianism,
is sound, it remains so whether mental acts or physical acts, or
both, are free and responsible. Indeed, Kane himself often shifts
between speaking of mental and physical acts as the subjects of
these attributions.
More importantly for our purposes, if a refutation of LP is to
have the significance Kane ascribes to it, we need to establish some
intimate connections between the concepts of free and responsible
and that of control. After all, it is the threat that indeterminism seems
to pose to our control over what we do that makes us pessimistic
about formulating a viable libertarianism. The close connection we
seek can be found by simply observing that control is a necessary
condition of an act being free and responsible.
Kane accepts, as an analytic truth, that if an act is solely a result
of luck or chance we cannot be responsible or in control of that
act. The point of contention is whether undetermined acts must
be acts that are merely lucky or chancy. Clarity surrounding this
quasi-verbal point of departure facilitates understanding Kane’s first
gambit against LP. Kane points out that while ordinary language
countenances the inference from ‘lucky’ to ‘uncontrolled’, there
is no similar commitment from ‘undetermined’ to ‘uncontrolled’.
‘Undetermined’ and ‘indeterministic process’ are technical terms
and so there is no natural license permitting us to infer that an
undetermined act is beyond our control. In fact, as we will presently
find, we often pre-philosophically conceive of undetermined acts
as being under our control as well as being freely and responsibly
performed.
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2.
Kane is right in thinking that there is no conceptual relationship
between ‘undetermined event’ and ‘lucky (chancy, fluky) event’.
Perhaps the clearest way to make this point is to begin with what
philosophers mean by the thesis of determinism. Although slight
differences exist among the various accounts of this thesis, the core
idea is that determinism claims that the past along with the laws of
nature make only one future physically possible. Since there must be
at least one physically possible future relative to any given time, the
truth of determinism effectively rules out the physical possibility of
more than one future at any given time. Indeterminism then, being
the denial of determinism, claims that the past along with the laws of
nature allow for at least two possible futures.2 Where determinism
tells us that the world’s events can follow only one course at any
time, indeterminism tells us that there are at least two different
courses that the world can take at a particular time; the past and
the laws of nature do not mandate a unique future.
Given this standard understanding of the thesis of indeterminism,
we are clearly in need of an argument for believing that we lack
control of undetermined events. All that indeterminism implies is
that at the time that we choose or decide on a course of action,
another course of action was physically possible. If our choice to
perform action A is undetermined, then the world – consistent with
the actual past that preceded our choice and the actual laws of nature
– (physically) could have continued without our choice to do A.
And, although indeterminism does not strictly imply this, we can
assume (with Kane) that if our choice to do A is undetermined, then
we could have made another choice at that very same time, with
the very same history, and with the very same laws of nature that
prevailed when we chose A.3
Highlighting the fact that there is no semantic relationship
between ‘undetermined event’ and ‘lucky event’ is the first step
in weakening our allegiance to LP. Kane’s second maneuver is to
enumerate cases in which LP appears to be falsified. He asks us to
consider the case of an angry husband who swings his arm intending
to break his wife’s favorite glass table (p. 227). We assume that the
momentum of his arm is undetermined right up to the point when
the husband’s arm meets the table (perhaps because the relevant
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neural pathways contain some indeterminism). Let us say that there
are two physically possible momenta, M and N. If momentum M
is generated, there will be sufficient force for the table to break; if
the momentum is N, there will not be sufficient force for the table to
break. As it so happens, the husband generates sufficient momentum
to break the table. We are now to consider whether we would judge
the husband responsible for breaking the glass table. If we do (legiti-
mately) judge him as responsible, LP is false. Kane, agreeing with
the assessments of J.L. Austin and Phillipa Foot of similar cases,
says that the husband can be held responsible because he intention-
ally and voluntarily did what he set out to do. Presumably, we can
infer from our intuitive assessment of the husband’s responsibility
that the husband was in control of his act. Being in control, it is
agreed, is a necessary condition of an agent being responsible for
an action. Indeterminism is thus compatible with responsibility and
control and so LP is falsified. Rather than eradicating control, the
indeterminism present in the husband’s act guarantees only that
regardless of the amount of effort he expends, there is a non-zero
probability that he will fail.
Suppose, on the other hand, that merely momentum N was gener-
ated. In this case – a case whose physical possibility is ensured
by the assumption of indeterminism – Kane informs us that the
husband, although not responsible for his failure to break the table
(since he did not attempt to fail), is responsible for the attempt. Just
as we would legitimately hold a would-be assassin responsible for
attempted murder, we are warranted in ascribing responsibility to
the dastardly husband. In this case, we should speak of the control
that the husband had of his attempt to break the glass table.
In virtue of implicitly replying upon very favorable probabilities,
we believe that Kane greatly minimizes the degree to which indeter-
minism subverts the control, and therefore the responsibility, that an
agent has of his actions. We now turn to substantiate this view.
3.
Consider a more articulated example of the husband’s table-
breaking. Assume that the indeterminism present in the relevant
neural pathways makes it 99% probable that the husband will fail
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in his attempt to break the table and only 1% probable that he will
succeed in satisfying his intention. There is a stochastic law that
tells us that the chance of the N-world being actualized is 99% and
that the probability of the M-world being actualized is 1%. This
assumption is obviously consistent with both possible outcomes
being undetermined. Finally, we assume for the sake of simplicity,
that the husband has no idea what the relevant probabilities are. The
husband swings his arm and breaks the table; what he intends to
happen does happen. Kane tells us that the husband is responsible
for his act. But without some crucial additional information – to be
presently supplied – this verdict is counter-intuitive. Although the
husband did what he intended to so, he did so ‘against all odds’.
In this case, the indeterminism that makes failure possible is so
extreme as to make failure overwhelmingly likely. Here, it does
seem proper to think of the husband as being lucky in having his act
match his intention, for the chances of him being successful were
prohibitively against him.
Compare the husband with Smith, who lends his new car to
Jones. Queried about the possibility that an argument yesterday
might have led someone to destabilize the steering mechanism,
Smith might concede in exasperation that it is not impossible, but
that the probability is negligible. But Smith might add that it would
serve Jones right if disaster did strike him, despite its improbability.
Suppose disaster does strike, and Jones is fatally injured. Jones’
fatal injury, at least intuitively, is purely accidental, and Smith is
not morally responsible.
Consider a natural way of saving the intuition that the husband is
responsible for breaking the table despite the enormous odds against
him. Assume as we implicitly did when we first were presented
with this case, that the husband freely and responsibly took the
risk of breaking the table. If the husband freely risked wrongdoing,
perhaps we can hold the husband responsible for wrongly risking
breaking the table. But, of course, this needs argument. Not every
risk of wrongdoing is morally prohibited. Smith risks wrongdoing
in lending his car and yet he does nothing morally wrong in taking
such a risk.
Notice too that, for Kane, taking the risk is a free and responsible
act only if it is not deterministically produced. Were it a deter-
LUCKY LIBERTARIANISM 99
minate act then, given the agent’s prior character and motives, he
could not but perform the risk-taking. Kane believes, as do most
libertarians, that freedom of behavior requires the (physical) possi-
bility of the agent failing to perform the action that he does, in
fact, perform. Indeed, Kane’s embraces indeterminism just because
he believes that it is required in the causal ancestry of an act to
allow the behavior (mental or physical) to be free. But once we
recognize that an agent is responsible for taking the risk only if
the choice to take the risk is indeterministically produced, we find
the very same problems for attributing responsibility. Specifically,
assume that the relevant probabilities make it only 1% likely that,
given his antecedent character and motives, the agent will in fact
take the risk. That he actually does so is, once again, ‘against all
odds’ and so it seems most counter-intuitive to think of the agent
being responsible (and thus in control) of this act. This strategy can
be indefinitely iterated. At any stage in the history of an act, we
can always, consistent with Kane’s thorough-going indeterminism,
construct a scenario where the indeterministically produced event
for which the agent is putatively responsible comes about despite the
prohibitive odds against it. Therefore, indeterminism can severely
subvert – indeed dissipate – the responsibility of the agent for his
indeterministically produced act.
This point is bolstered when we reflect upon a case where the
agent’s behavior is an indeterministic product of a randomizing
device. Suppose, for example, that the momentum to be generated is
a function of a pellet landing in a particular slot on a roulette wheel
or the timing of some sub-atomic particle produced by radioactive
decay. In these cases, regardless of odds for and against momentum
M occurring, we would undoubtedly detach the agent from any
responsibility and control. It seems difficult to justify, then, how
we can legitimately attribute responsibility to the husband for his
successful table-breaking. The only allegedly relevant difference is
that in the case of the husband it his own prior character and motives
that causally produced the probabilities for his arm to swing with
momentum M, while in the case of the roulette wheel, the probabil-
ities are produced by something external to, and independent of, the
husband. But bracketing the very contentious point that it is proper
to think of the husband’s indeterministically produced character and
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motives as ‘his own’, it is mysterious why the nature of the cause of
the probabilities should be of any consequence. After all, once the
indeterminism sets in – be it as a product of motives and character
or by the spinning of a roulette wheel – the agent disappears from
the scene. After the moment that the indeterminism is produced in
the agent, the agent loses any influence that he allegedly had.
But what if the probabilities are not prohibitively against the
agent performing the act he intends? Kane may not hold the very
strong position that an agent is responsible and therefore free
regarding all indeterministic actions which are products of the
agent’s prior character and motives. One may agree that when the
odds are prohibitively against the agent doing what he sets his mind
to do, he is rightfully absolved of responsibility, but suggest that
when the odds are far more conducive to the agent’s success, he is
legitimately viewed as being responsible for his behavior. To take a
radical example of this suggestion, assume the mirror image of the
stochastic law that we earlier presumed to govern the husband’s arm
moving with momentum M. In this case, the husband, as before,
intends to break the table, but in this case has a 99% probability of
generating the momentum M that is required for his intention to be
satisfied. It may be thought that, at least in cases like these, where
the probability urges that the intended action occur, the agent can
legitimately be held responsible for his indeterministically produced
act. So, LP is shown to be false.
The problem with this seemingly more palatable position is that
it inevitably transmutes into the far stronger, more implausible,
view. To see this, we need to briefly review the Kanean etiology
of character and choice. The motives and character that are causally
responsible for the 99% probability that the husband will accom-
plish what he intends, are themselves indeterministic products of
prior choices. These prior choices are themselves indeterministic
causal products of a yet earlier character. These choices – what Kane
sometimes appropriately refers to as ‘self-forming acts’ – make us
who we are in the sense that they compose part of our character
and motivational structure. These causal chains which extend indefi-
nitely back into the agent’s past are therefore suffused with pockets
of indeterminism. This has the consequence that our character and
motives at any particular time (i.e., who we are at any particular
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time) are not fully under our control. Since our character and motives
at any particular time are formed, in part, by choices which them-
selves are indeterministic products of a yet earlier character and
motivational structure, we could have had identical histories up
to any particular moment of our lives and been different persons
(selves) than we actually are. But this lack of total control and
responsibility is more than compensated by the freedom it allows
us to have. Had the causal chains been deterministic rather than
probabilistic, we could have full control and responsibility but, in
the process, we would be relegated to puppet status.
The problem insinuates in Kane’s theory even if we grant him a
‘best-case’ scenario. Returning to table-breaking case, we assume
that the husband’s choice to break the table had a 99% probability
of issuing from his antecedent character. In this case, there would
be no surprise from the husband, his wife, or anyone who knew him
well, that he formed this intention. He is known as a quick-tempered
man and so this intention is understandable or ‘in character’. In this
case, it is reasonable to claim that the husband is responsible for,
and in control of, his decision to break the table. Recall, however,
that the character from which this choice was indeterministically
produced is, in part, constituted by a prior choice that was, itself,
an indeterministic product of the agent’s prior character. That the
choice is indeterministically produced guarantees that the proba-
bility of it being issued from its antecedent character is less than
100%; that is, there is some chance that the agent could have had
a different choice given precisely the same character that issued in
his actual choice. We can afford to be overly generous and again
assign a 99% probability to the occurrence of the choice given the
antecedent character and motives. But the probability of the agent
having his current character has been somewhat lowered (99% of
99%). This decrease is tiny but since these chains are presumably
of indefinitely, great length (we make thousands, if not millions
of conflicted decisions over a lifetime), the responsibility for, and
control over, our character will diminish and will eventually be
very small. Almost inevitably, our responsibility and control of
our characters will be akin to the responsibility and control of a
husband who intends not to break the table when he strikes it (i.e.,
he intends to generate only momentum N) and yet, in virtue of
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the indeterministically produced probabilities, has a 99% chance
of breaking the table anyway. Effectively, then, we have a reductio
of Kane’s position, in that the generous assumption we initially
made regarding the probability of the husband’s mental state must
be rescinded. Generalizing, we can say that any relatively mature
agent, i.e., any person who has made a large number of conflicted
decisions, cannot be responsible for, or in control of, his character,
motives, and choices.
The disagreement with Kane can be put slightly differently. Both
Kane and we agree that responsibility and control are heritable
properties. An agent may be in a situation where he would not be
responsible for, or in control of, his behavior were it not for the
fact that he is responsible for placing himself in this very situation.
Responsibility can ‘span’ probabilistic causal relations and so we
can legitimately be held responsible for our indeterminate character
and choices. We believe that Kane has mistakenly inferred from
this that the degree or extent of the responsibility survives intact
and undiminished throughout an indefinitely large number of these
indeterministic events. We have argued that this is not the case; the
amount of responsibility and control of an agent’s actions neces-
sarily decreases along the probabilistic causal chain, ineluctably
diminishing to the point where it is no longer feasible to conceive
of the agent being responsible for his indeterministically caused
character, motives, and choices.
Strictly speaking, Kane is correct in rejecting LP; not all undeter-
mined acts of an agent are, or at least need be, lucky. Nevertheless,
the spirit of LP remains. Indeterminism in the ancestry of an agent’s
act does erode responsibility and control. Moreover, an extremely
large number of our conflicted choices, decisions, and intentions are,
in fact, fortuitous.
4.
Branch Rickey spoke wisely when he said that luck is the residue
of design. There are situations in which we can somewhat control
the extent to which luck plays a part in our lives. Consider the
case where Tiger Woods and I are competing in a putting contest.
We each have an opportunity to sink 45 foot putts covering very
difficult, undulating greens. Woods is an expert putter; I am a tyro.
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Although there are chance events and states of affairs that can influ-
ence our respective successes (a gust of wind arises after we putt,
a blade of grass may grow just a fraction of an inch while the putt
is tracking the hole, etc.), Woods’ skill minimizes the effect these
chance events will have on the success of his putting. He is far more
likely than I am to hit a put that would go straight in the center of
the hole and so these chance events that may alter, ever so slightly,
the course of his putt are unlikely to make his ball miss the hole
completely. Not so in my case, of course. The probabilities of the
occurrence of these chance events, we may assume, are the same for
both of us. Still, despite the fact that we have the same intention,
the luck factor will probably negatively affect my opportunity of
success more than Woods’. If I make the putt I am lucky; indeed
with my putting ability I am inordinately lucky. Woods is far less
lucky if he makes his putt. Expertise, not intention, accounts for
the difference by better managing chance. Moreover, only if the
expertise is a product of deterministic events over which Woods has
control can it accommodate the difference that fluky events have on
our respective outcomes.
An analogue to this is where both a powerful and a weak man
try to break their respective wives’ tables. The stronger husband –
analogous to Woods – is afforded more latitude than the weaker
husband regarding the effect the indeterminism has on his ability
to satisfy his intention. While a certain degree of indeterminism in
the weaker husband’s arm movement may suffice for the table not
breaking, an equal amount of indeterminism may not prevent the
stronger man from generating enough momentum for the table to
break and so to fulfill his objective.4
Unfortunately, this Rickeyan observation does not ultimately aid
Kane’s cause. The partial control and responsibility that appears
present in both the Woods and husband case is predicated on the fact
that both Woods and the stronger husband are responsible for, and
in control of, their characters from which their decisions, choices,
and intentions flow. If Woods were not in control of his laudatory
character traits such as perseverance, patience, and dedication, then
he would not be in control of the indeterministic results of these
traits. Similarly, if the stronger husband is not responsible for his
unwavering resolve to lift weights, he is not responsible for his
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ability to accomplish his goal despite the fact that the same amount
of indeterminism present in his arm-moving would suffice to prevent
the weaker husband from breaking his wife’s table. The argument
has shown that the agents are neither responsible for, nor in control
of, what is required to be responsible and in control of their current
behavior. In virtue of a litany of indeterministic and conflicted
choices, Woods and the powerful husband have extinguished the
limited heritable power that their responsibility and control once
possessed.
5.
Although Kane believes that he has quieted the problem voiced
in LP, he acknowledges that there are legitimate residual concerns
whether robust free-willed agents can co-exist with indeterminism.
To Kane, the problem with using cases like ‘table-breaking’ to
refute LP is that these examples are not representative of cases
that are paradigmatic of free willed individuals. Traditionally, free
will has been viewed as a dual power, i.e., the power to freely and
responsibility perform the action that the agent, in fact, performs, as
well as the power to freely and responsibly perform an alternative
act. But since the ‘table-breaking’ case involves an alternative act
that would not have been intentionally and voluntarily performed
(i.e., the husband’s not breaking the table), the case fails to be a
good test of the intuition that grounds LP. Cases that really matter to
the assessment of the spirit of LP are those where the agent freely
and responsibly chooses whichever choice he makes. In effect, Kane
believes that he needs to show the falsity of a slight variant of LP,
LP* (p. 228).
(LP*) If it is undetermined at t whether an agent voluntarily and
intentionally does A at t or voluntarily and intentionally
does otherwise, then the agent doing one of these rather
than the other would be a matter of luck or chance and so
could not be a free and responsible action.
It is not surprising that our discussion of Kane’s treatment of LP
applies, mutadis mutandis, to his discussion of LP*, for LP* is a
sort of ‘doubling up’ of LP. Where with LP only one of the two
possible actions is performed voluntarily and intentionally, we now
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need to deal with cases where both of the options open to an agent
can be performed voluntarily and intentionally. To the extent that we
believe that Kane’s treatment of LP is found wanting, we also find
his discussion of LP* flawed. Nevertheless, much can be learned
if we enter into the discussion of LP* anew. By doing so, we will
unearth distinct, fundamental problems that make the prospects of
any viable libertarianism still bleaker.
6.
It is the truth of LP* that many of Kane’s critics advocate. Al Mele’s
discussion of an instance of LP* is representative.5 In the actual
world, John succumbs to the temptation to arrive late to a meeting,
while in a close possible world, John*, who shares an indentical
psychophysical history with John up to the moment of decision,
resists this temptation. Since there is nothing about the powers,
states of mind, character, etc., that differentiate John from John*,
it appears as though the fact that John succumbs to the temptation
rather than resisting it is a matter of luck. John* was blessed with
good luck (assuming we agree that it was good to resist the tempta-
tion to arrive late) and John was burdened with bad luck (assuming
that we agree that it was bad to give in to temptation).
Kane’s response to this and other like examples is ingenious.
We should first concede that this ‘temptation’ case is importantly
different from the ‘table-breaking’ case and cannot be handled in
precisely the same manner. John, unlike the husband, does not have
his mind set on what he wants to do before the indeterminism
is introduced. Rather than having an undifferentiated will, John
is experiencing an internal battle. On the one hand, John wants
to arrive late to his meeting; on the other, he wants to resist this
temptation. We can view this interior struggle as a fight between
John’s prudential and moral considerations for acting. For Kane, it
is this internal conflict that is the source of the indeterminism. This
indeterminism is fused with the mental battle that John is experi-
encing in trying to decide what to do. Eventually, John submits to
the temptation to arrive late. This choice although undetermined, is
one that John endorses (i.e., accepts as a product of his own will),
manufacturers freely (i.e., there is no coercion or compulsion in its
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creation), and is responsible for (i.e., is voluntarily and intentionally
produced by the agent’s efforts to do so). Furthermore, John would
have had exactly the same relationship to his choice had he decided
to perform the moral act. (This is equivalent to holding John* fully
responsible for his act).
Kane admits that the indeterminism produced by the internal
conflict in John’s will does reduce his control over each option when
considered individually. But this minor concession to those who
believe that indeterminism excludes responsibility is far outweighed
by the fact that John has plural voluntary control over the options
when considered together (pp. 237–238). In effect, this means that
John has the ability to bring about either of these two outcomes
when he wants, because he most wants it at the moment he decides,
and can do so in an uncompelled and uncoerced manner. In virtue
of the indeterminism that is present in the process of creating self-
forming actions, an agent is necessarily precluded from having
full control of his choice prior to his actual making of the choice.
Nevertheless, in cases of plural voluntary control, agents “exer-
cise control over their present and future lives then and there by
deciding” (p. 238). Although the choices of John and John* are
undetermined, our ordinary inclinations to praise John* and blame
John are warranted.
This theory also provides us with a phenomenological account of
decision-making. Presumably, the less difference there is between
the probabilities of the two events, the more tension John will
experience. Since the indeterminism is physically manifested in the
turmoil in the agent’s neural pathways and psychologically mani-
fested in tension and ambivalence, an agent would presumably feel
most tense and ambivalent in the case where there is a 50/50 chance
of either option occurring. On the other extreme, if, for example,
there were a 99% probability of John deciding to submit to tempta-
tion and only a 1% chance of him resisting, little mental anguish
would be produced.
7.
We need to consider whether, quite generally, plural voluntary
control is sufficient for moral responsibility in contexts of indeter-
minism. As we have noted, Kane focuses his discussion primarily
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on the interesting counterexamples advanced by Mele and others.
Mele articulates his concern over how identically situated, psycho-
physical twins might responsibly differ in choice or action. Mele’s
charge is serious, but by presenting an example in which indeter-
minism is situated solely in the mind of the agent, it allows Kane to
avoid confronting a pervasive problem. Imagine that there are two
recovering addicts who are psycho-physically identical. Each addict
inhabits a distinct possible world, w1 and w2. Assume, although it
is not strictly necessary, that w1 and w2 are indetrerministic worlds
identical up until time t. At time t in w1 our recovering addict finds
himself in a part of town notorious for drug dealing. At time t in
w2, of course, our recovering addict finds himself in the very same
part of town. But the worlds diverge indeterministically just after
t. In w1 our recovering addict, quite against the odds, encounters
not a single drug dealer, and his struggle between the desire to stay
clean and the desire to backslide is decided in favor of staying clean.
In w2 our recovering addict encounters several dealers, and his
struggle between the desire to stay clean and the desire to backslide
is decided in favor of backsliding. Each of our recovering addicts,
we assume, has plural voluntary control, but the addict in w1 was
unquestionably lucky, while the addict in w2 was not. That the area
was free of drug dealers at the particular time he was passing by
has absolutely nothing to do with the character and mindset of the
struggling addict. Even those agents who possess plural voluntary
control over what they do are not fully responsible for what they do,
since the struggle between desires is decided in large part by luck or
undetermined events beyond their control.
Consider the recovering addict in w1 insisting that his plural
voluntary control over his choice to stay clean confers on him
the full responsibility for doing so. We would not respond with
unalloyed congratulations. He happened to be very lucky that his
desire to stay clean defeated his desire to backslide. Had the more
probable sequence of events taken place, as it did in w2, our
fortunate addict would have returned to his old habits.
But notice that in indeterministic worlds there will not be many
cases in which plural voluntary control over our actions is sufficient
for moral responsibility. The strength and significance of our desires
is a function of circumstances over which we do not have control.
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Whether our lives are directed according to one desire or another is
a matter of the chancy set of challenges we happen to face. Embrac-
ing a virtuous desire to help another hardly makes us praiseworthy,
if, by sheer chance, the temptation to lead us away was not so
strong. Embracing a vicious desire to help oneself hardly makes us
blameworthy, if fortuitously, the lure of beneficence happened to be
weak.
8.
Although Kane emphasizes the indeterminism present in the agent’s
deliberative process, he acknowledges that the considerations which
play a role in the deliberative process are themselves also indeter-
ministically produced. This means that the prudential and moral
reasons (what Kane calls ‘chance-selected considerations’) that
actually constitute John’s interior battle could have been different.
So, for example, any prudential consideration (say, making more
money) that inclined John to act self-interestedly may not have been
a constituent in the deliberative process. That it is a consideration is
a function of John’s previously indeterministically formed character.
There are, as Kane notes, many ways that undetermined occur-
rences can play a role in a deliberative process and influence what is
considered without, at least intuitively, undermining the autonomy
of the process. For instance, the considerations that enter into
creative problem-solving at least appear to involve chance associ-
ations, inspiration, and sudden insights or realizations. We find the
creative achievements of Copernicus and Kepler perfectly proper
objects of praise. The role of undetermined associations in the
scientific creations of a Copernicus are considerably less extensive
than the role of undetermined associations in our scientific thought.
That we would so much as notice a salient and important scientific
relationship is extremely unlikely. That Copernicus would fail to
notice that relationship, on the other hand, is extremely unlikely.
Geniuses, like experts, simply manage chance better.
Fair enough; as far as this goes. We can think of each of us as
being experts on the considerations that result indeterministically
from our own character. It certainly is not as though we are normally
shocked at entertaining a certain consideration that inclines us to act
in way or another. We view these considerations or reasons not as
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something foreign but as being consonant with our already formed
character. But this only pushes the problem suggested by LP one
step further back. We need an account of how we can be responsible
for a character that itself was an indeterministical product of a great
number of difficult decisions.
9.
To this point our objections have been localized. It would be useful
to see if problems with Kane’s theory can be derived from concerns
other than free will. Specifically, we suggest that Kane’s libertanian
theory has limited explanatory power under any viable account of
explanation.
Recall that having plural voluntary control over a set of outcomes
is having the ability to bring about whichever outcome is willed
(most wanted), when the outcome is willed, and for the reasons
that the outcome is willed. This is all to be accomplished without
coercion and compulsion. Plural voluntary control is manifested at
the moment the agent decides on a singular course of action. When
the agent makes the choice, he ‘then and there’ exercises control
over his present and future lives.
Suppose that John fulfils the conditions for having plural volun-
tary control over the set of options composed of his submission
and resistance to temptation. Assume that John resists temptation
and is asked to explain his action. Kane would not view this as a
particularly difficult request. The explanation consists of the moral
considerations that engaged his prudential reasons in internal battle
(and eventually proved victorious) along with a relevant probabil-
istic law. At this point, some philosophers balk. Some may claim
that no undetermined events can be explained and since John’s
decision is undetermined, it is unavailable to explanation. Others
may be amenable to the possibility of explaining undetermined
events, in general, but reject the view that improbable undetermined
events can be explained. According to these thinkers, if the proba-
bility of John resisting temptation is less than 50%, it cannot be
explained.
While we do see a problem with Kane’s notion of explanation,
it does not reside in either of these rather general objections to
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the possibility of explaining undetermined events. Not only are we
willing to grant that undetermined events, even improbable undeter-
mined events, can be explained, but we also concede a point that
Kane does not make explicit. We also grant, for the sake of discus-
sion, that the reasons that Kane appeals to can serve as causes,
albeit probabilistic causes, of the eventual act that is performed.
If John resists the temptation, we can say that his moral reasons
probabilistically caused his resistance; if John submits to tempta-
tion, we can say that his prudential reasons probabilistically caused
his submission. And we grant that we can truly speak of a particular
set of reasons being the probabilistic cause of an event even if the
event is unlikely. So, for example, if John had only a 20% chance
of resisting temptation given the internal battle transpiring in his
will, we concede that moral reasons are the probabilistic cause of
his resistance if he decides to resist the temptation before him.
To articulate our concern we need a basic idea of the nature of
explanations of undetermined events. Suppose there is a photon
approaching a slightly tilted polarizer. Contemporary physics tells
us that it is undetermined whether the photon will be transmitted or
absorbed by the polarizer. Suppose that the photon gets absorbed.
Crucial to the viability of an explanation of this event is the exist-
ence of (true) probabilistic or statistical laws. Let us suppose that
the relevant probabilistic law tells us that a photon that strikes a
polarizer at such-and-such an angle has an 80% probability of being
absorbed.6 Let us further suppose (although it is not strictly neces-
sary) that we understand the workings of the micro-world well
enough for us to understand why these probabilities are correct.
By offering the probabilistic law and the account for its truth, we
have provided an explanation for why the photon gets absorbed
when striking the polarizer at the given angle. But suppose that
what had happened was that the photon was transmitted and not
absorbed. The explanation for this event would be the same as the
prior explanation. At first blush, this may appear bizarre. We have
the identical explanation for an event that occurs though it only has
a 20% chance of occurring as we do for an event that occurs that
has an 80% probability of occurring. But, perhaps this is not so
strange.
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First, reflection indicates that the explanations for both events
would need to be structurally similar. After all, the difference in
the probabilities of the occurrences of these events should not
make the type of explanations differ. Furthermore, if explanations
for the transmission of the photon are disallowed, we seem to be
left without the resources for explaining any improbable event, a
consequence that strikes many, though not all, as unacceptable.
Moreover, and this introduces the problem facing Kane’s explana-
tory machinery, the immediate disenchantment with which we often
greet the idea of undetermined events having explanations can
be explained by our almost automatic tendency to conflate plain
explanations with contrastive explanations. We tend to think that
the explanation of the occurrence of an event, per se, necessarily
explains why this event occurred rather than an alternative. We
should resist this inclination. Although we can provide explana-
tions for each event, regardless of which event happens to occur
(and, recall, that the supposition that the events are undetermined
guarantees that either event could occur), we have not thereby
provided reasons why one event rather than the other becomes
actual. The person who wants to know why the photon was absorbed
rather than transmitted has been given no help when he learns the
statistical laws that govern the initial conditions of the event to be
explained.
But now we approach a central problem for Kane’s libertari-
anism. It is our claim that only contrastive explanations of undeter-
mined events will suffice for an agent having control over such
events and that Kane’s libertarianism is impotent to yield these
explanations. We now show that without the resources to contrast-
ively explain why, for example, John resisted temptation rather than
submitted to it, Kane’s attempt to rebut LP* is doomed.
10.
The case of the photon indicates the essential difference between
plain control and plain explanation on the one hand, and contrastive
control and contrastive explanation on the other. Regardless of
whether the photon gets transmitted or absorbed, reference to the
probabilistic laws along with the initial conditions (e.g., that the
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polarizer is slanted at such-and-such an angle to the vertical) suffices
as an explanation of what occurs. But if the same explanation can
serve equally well, no matter what happens, then it certainly cannot
serve as an explanation as to why one event occurs rather than the
other. Since the explanation suffices for the actual event and could
(and indeed would) have sufficed for the unactualized event had it
occurred, then the explanation cannot yield any insight as to why
the other possible event did not occur.
It is one thing to recognize and accept the distinction between
plain and contrastive explanations, it is quite another to accept that
Kane, or any other free will theorist for that matter, is required to
have the resources to provide us with contrastive as well as plain
explanations of the actions that the agent performs. Why does the
control necessary for responsibility require contrastive explanation?
Why, that is, does the ability to perform an act that is ‘up to’ the
agent demand that there be a contrastive explanation of the act that
is performed regardless of which of the alternative acts become
realized?7
One way to recognize that we should demand contrastive
explanation in addition to plain explanation is that without this addi-
tional requirement we will be given an explanation of an act that is
compatible with the unactualized alternative act. So, in principle,
Kane may provide an explanation of why John resisted temptation
that is consistent with John’s submission to temptation. We know
know why John did what he did but we are at a loss to know why
John acted as he did to the exclusion of the other alternative open to
him. To have control over an action does not merely demand that the
agent have the power to perform that action; it should also demand
that the agent have the power not to perform an alternative act that
he could have performed.
Suppose I am in the situation where my alternatives are to either
pick a can of tomato soup or select a can of vegetable soup. If I am to
be credited with being in control of this behavior, I should have the
power to select one of these alternatives at the expense of the other.
It would be an enormous capitulation of a worthwhile free will to
have our power to make one selection manifested only if I pick (and
thus have the power to pick) both.
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Kane may respond that the cases where there is an internal
conflict of the will are significantly different than the case of
the photon. While precisely the same explanation is given of the
photon’s absorption and transmission, whichever event actually
occurs, there are different explanations offered for John’s submis-
sion and his resistance to temptation, whichever of these outcomes
eventuate. If John submits, the explanation makes reference to his
engaged prudential reasons; if John resists, the explanation makes
reference to his considered moral reasons. Since prudential and
moral reasons are at odds with each other, since, that is, John’s
giving into temptation cannot be explained by his moral consider-
ations and John’s resistance cannot be explained by his prudential
reasons, Kane’s merely plain explanation of whichever outcome
eventuates is, implicitly, a contrastive explanation. Thus, Kane may
accept the demand for contrastive explanation but insist that he has
met it.
But this response promotes a false picture of what is actu-
ally transpiring. Upon hearing this Kanean explanatory story, one
conjures up the impression of the prudential and moral considera-
tions doing battle in John’s mind with eventually one set of reasons
becoming victorious just prior to John’s decision. But this is not, as
Kane would be the first to admit, quite what is happening. While
it is true that there is a conflict of John’s will consisting of the
competitive reasons, the victor is determined by John’s decision. It
is not as though John’s decision is determined by the victorious set
of considerations. This latter way of looking at the matter, the way
that is fostered by the discussion of different explanations at work,
has both the logical and temporal priorities backwards. If this were
not the wrong way of looking at the matter then, in principle (and
disregarding the assumption of the density of time just to make the
point), we could predict with certainty what John’s decision would
be from a precise calculation of the micro-movements in his neural
pathways. Effectively, then, if the victor of the interior battle was
assured before the decision, the decision would be determined, and
we know that this consequence is verboten.
The upshot is that although the competing reasons exist prior
to the agent’s decision (it is the conflict among the reasons that
are the source of the indeterministic process that culminates in the
114 M. ALMEIDA AND M. BERNSTEIN
decision), the explanatory nature of whichever set of reasons that
are used in the explanation becomes formed only at the moment
of the agent’s decision. This is not merely an epistemic claim.
It is not merely that someone (even the agent himself) cannot
know which set of reasons will constitute the set that explains the
eventual choice (although this is true), it is rather that the set of
reasons that becomes the one used in the explanation of the eventual
decision only become explanatory at the moment of decision. The
ex post facto explanatory nature of the set of reasons is, at root, a
metaphysical claim.
Thus, it is misleading to speak of John’s prudential reasons
explaining his decision to act prudentially or John’s moral reasons
explaining his decision to act morally. The ex post facto meta-
physical nature of these probabilistic reasons robs them of any
contrastive explanatory force since these reasons are impotent to
give us any insight as to why John acted one way rather than the
other. While they may make John’s behavior intelligible or even, in
some broad sense, explicable, reference to these reasons necessarily
fails to satisfy the demands that control places on the possession of
free will.
Lack of contrastive explanations makes a mockery of moral
deliberation. John, we suppose, had to deliberate over what to do.
Presumably he had to choose, hypothetically, the action that he
thought he had most reason to perform. But if contrastive explana-
tions are not available, then there is no action that he has most reason
to perform; i.e., John has no better reasons to perform one action
rather than another since having comparatively better reasons for
his behavior just is possessing a contrastive explanation for what he
does. As a result, the tie between moral deliberation and choice is
severed. The intuition grounding LP* remains unrefuted.
Unrefuted, perhaps, but is the intuition behind LP* irrefutable?
Can libertarians, or anyone else for that matter, provide us with
contrastive explanations of undetermined outcomes. It is fair to say
that the jury is still out on this question. Nevertheless, we believe
that Kane would need to make draconian modifications to his liber-
tarian view even if we countenance the possibility of contrastive
explanations for undetermined events. The problem facing those
who advocate the possibility of contrastive explanations of undeter-
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mined events is clearly manifested in the case of the photon. In
one possible world, the photon approaches the titled polarizer and
is absorbed; in another possible world the photon approaches the
titled polarizer and is transmitted. The two possible worlds are
identical up until the moment that the photon strikes the polarizer
in each world. How can we give an explanation that purports to
tell us why one outcome actually happened (say, the world in
which the photon gets absorbed is the actual world) when there
is nothing different about the two worlds up to the moment that
the photon hits the polarizer? The guiding thought behind this
problem is succinctly stated by David Lewis in what we may call
the ‘contrastive question’.
(CQ) A contrastive why question with ‘rather’ requests infor-
mation about the features that differentiate the actual
causal history from its counterfactual alternative.8
The relevant causal history of the photon terminates at the instant
it strikes the polarizer. Its counterfactual alternative has an identical
history but a different future. John and his doppelganger are in the
same situation. Their careers stop being identical at the moment
John gives in to temptation (and John* resists temptation). In both
cases, since their respective causal histories are identical, it is
impossible to answer the request for a contrastive explanation.
Pace Lewis, however, we believe contrastive explanations of
undetermined events are possible. Suppose that I equally wish to
teach at universities A and B and that the only offer I receive is from
A. Someone knowing only that I was equally interested in both jobs
might ask why did I go to A to teach rather than B. The obvious
explanation is that I went to A rather than B because only A offered
me a position. I might even omit the ‘only’, explaining my behavior
just in terms of the position that A offered.
Conversationally, this explanation implies that B did not offer
me a position. We can see this by considering the scenario where I
receive offers from both A and B. In this case, it would be wrong
to explain my subsequent teaching at A rather than B in terms of
the offer that A submitted. I can plainly explain why I took the
position at A in terms of my desires and the fact that A offered me
a position, but since, ex hypothesi, my desires to teach at B were of
the same depth and intensity as my desires to teach at A and there
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were offers that I found equally attractive forthcoming from both
universities, there is no relevant difference between the two possible
outcomes to answer a ‘why’ question. Lewis, then, would appear to
be mistaken. We can give substantive answers to contrastive ‘why’
questions of undetermined events. There are occasions when we can
give true and adequate explanations of why one outcome rather than
another occurred despite the fact that the outcome that occurs is
undetermined.
Peter Lipton has suggested a plausible principle that grounds
our judgments in cases like these. He calls it the ‘Difference
Condition’.9
(DC) To explain why P rather than Q, we must cite a causal
difference between P and not-Q, consisting of a cause of
P and the absence of a corresponding event in the history
of not-Q. (our italics)
A corresponding event is an event that would bear the same
relationship to Q as the cause of P bears to P.
Thus, we can explain why I go to A rather than B when the only
job offer I receive is from A (this offer is the causal difference) while
I cannot explain why I go to A rather than B when I receive equally
attractive offers from both schools (the offer from B would bear the
same relationship to my teaching at B that the offer from A plays in
my teaching at A).
We are not here interested in assessing the adequancy of (DC)
as a criterion of contrastive explanation.10 Our current concern is
whether this understanding of the nature of contrastive explanation
is of any help to Kane’s libertarian theory. We want to know whether
Kane can exploit (DC) to argue that his discussion of LP* allows the
robust sort of personal control that is necessary to any view of free
will.
(DC) can do nothing to help Kane. This is evident once we
reflect again upon the case of John and John*. This case, like others
that Kane speaks of in his discussion of LP*, are precisely those
that lack any causal difference in the actual and merely possible
worlds. John and John* are portrayed as being identical up to the
very moments of decisions where John gives in to his temptation
and John* resists. Although (DC) allows for the intelligibility and
adequacy of contrastive explanations of undetermined events, it is
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impotent to aid Kane’s refutation of LP*. DC requires a difference
in the histories of the alternative possible outcomes and this demand
is (essentially) omitted from the types of cases that motivate the
argument in LP*.
Consider a slightly different case that seems to make sense of
contrastive explanations for undetermined events. An advantage of
this case is that it makes evident that the notion of probabilistic, and
not determinative, causation is at play.
Suppose that a randomizer is connected to each of two doors.
The randomizer is set so that door A has a very large chance of
opening and that door B has a tiny chance of opening. In fact,
in this ceremony’s long history, door B has never opened. (Make
the probabilistic laws yield, say, the probability of A opening
99.99% and B opening 0.01%). Suppose that Jones knows about
these probabilities and is coerced into passing through the door
that opens. He also knows that if passes through door B (and not
door A) he will suffer great agony. The randomizer is started and
door B is the door that opens. Jones is dumbstruck and asks “Why
did door B open rather than door A?”. The answer is that the
malicious Smith had previously manipulated the randomizer so that
the respective probabilities for door A and door B opening were
precisely reversed.11
Again, we seem to have an intelligible and quite reasonable
question and an intelligible and quite reasonable answer; we have
a viable contrastive explanation of an undetermined event. Again,
however, the case is crucially disanalogous with those that Kane
operates. In this case, the manipulation of the randomizer makes
a response to the contrastive question possible. This difference in
the causal histories of the two worlds (one where no manipulation
takes place, the other where manipulation occurs) is not mirrored
in the actual and counterfactual worlds in which John inhabits, for
in these, the divergence occurs at the moment of his choice and not
before.
The intuition that is the basis of LP* is captured in CQ. Although
the truth of CQ is compatible with the existence of contrastive
explanations of undetermined events, none of these contrastive
explanations can serve as a model to help Kane’s version of
libertarianism. Although Kane has the resources to explain why
118 M. ALMEIDA AND M. BERNSTEIN
undetermined choices and decisions occur, his essential reliance
upon the ex post facto nature of reasons disables him from supplying
contrastive explanations of a person’s undetermined choices and
decisions. Since the viability of contrastive explanations for an
agent’s choices and decisions are necessary for an adequate account
of control, Kane’s theory cannot accommodate a robust notion of
control that a robust theory of libertarian free will requires. The oft-
mentioned ‘lack of control’ objection to libertarianism expressed
in LP* remains unrefuted and, unfortunately, the prospects of
resolution do not appear promising.
NOTES
∗ We thank Bob Kane for very detailed and helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1 “Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeter-
minism,” Journal of Philosophy 96(5) (May, 1999). All parenthetical page
numbers refer to this work.
2This assumption just makes the discussion easier. Strictly, the occurrence of an
undetermined choice is compatible with the physical impossibility of making a
different choice.
3 Strictly speaking, the denial of determinism entails that if there is a possible
future f at t (i.e., time does not come to a stop at t), then there is also an alternative
possible future f* at t. We make the simplifying assumption throughout that there
is a possible future.
4 Kane denies that it is meaningful to compare amounts (degrees) of indeter-
minism. We disagree – the probabilistic laws seem to make such comparisons
meaningful – but here we simply assume its intelligibility.
5 See Mele’s review of Kane’s “The Significance of Free Will,” The Journal of
Philosophy 95(11) (Nov., 1998), 581–584.
6 Complications arise concerning the nature of the probabilistic laws that are
supposed to be used. Here, we have used a more specific law than would be used
if either one did not know the angle at which the photon strikes the polarizer or
believes that the angle of contract is irrelevant to the photon’s probability of being
absorbed. Undoubtedly, even more specific laws would be employed if we knew
of them and appreciated their relevance. For example, perhaps the humidity of the
chamber in which the experiment is conducted is relevant. Then, we would use
this law to get a more accurate assessment of the probabilities of this particular
proton in these particular circumstances being absorbed/transmitted.
7 We are requiring contrastive explanations of outcomes in addition to plain
explanations. Just as it is a mistake that a (plain) explanation inherently provides
reasons why one act occurred rather than other, it is also an error to believe
that contrastive explanations inherently ‘contain’ explanations of the events in
LUCKY LIBERTARIANISM 119
question. For more on this, see Christopher Hitchcock, “Contrastive Explanation
and the Demons of Determinism,” British Journal of the Philosophy of Science
(Dec., 1999), 585–612 and Philip Percival, “Lewis’s Dilemma of Explanation
under Indeterminism Exposed and Resolved,” Mind 109(2000), 39–66.
8 David Lewis, “Causal Explanation,” in Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 231.
9 Peter Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation (London and New York:
Routledge, 1991), pp. 43–44.
10 See Hitchcock, op. cit., pp. 595–595 for a sympathetic, yet critical, discussion
of (DC).
11 Percival, op. cit., pp. 55–56.
The University of Texas
6900 North Loop 1604 West
San Antonio, TX 78249-0643
USA

